I conducted a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to identify possible security and privacy concerns.

I've discussed DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy issues about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This implies that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive proof that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, particularly offered the growing issues around information personal privacy, surveillance, the potential abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising issues about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app yesterday also. - Bespoke encryption and data obfuscation methods exist, with indicators that they might be utilized to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public keys, rather than depending on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking records detailed user behavior without clear authorization.
• WebView control exists, which might permit for the app to gain access to private external browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A considerable portion of the evaluated code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers numerous special gadget identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System residential or commercial properties, wavedream.wiki installed packages, and root detection systems suggest prospective anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for classihub.in the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists use to root their Android devices.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, suggesting potential tracking and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by region. - Hardcoded gadget model lists recommend the application may act in a different way depending on the identified hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract extra device details. E.g. if it can not figure out the device through standard Android SIM lookup (because consent was not granted), it tries manufacturer particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, a number of observed behaviors align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which might facilitate unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible security systems.
• The app executes calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to load additional.so files. This facility is not normally checked by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of complexity to the analysis process and obscures the full extent of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly intensify opportunities, possibly making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a legitimate email, which ought to currently supply sufficient authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to aggressively gather and send special device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds common analytics practices, possibly making it possible for consistent user tracking and re-identification across gadgets. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation methods and network communication with third-party tracking services, call for a higher level of examination from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code loading in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app could enable the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a major potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is provided that remotely deployed code execution is being done, only that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to detecting rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material protection are crucial, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent procedures in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and companies considering installing DeepSeek needs to know these possible dangers. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or federal government environment, additional vetting and security controls need to be imposed before enabling its deployment on handled gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon fixed code review and does not suggest that all identified functions are actively used. Further investigation is required for definitive conclusions.